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IN MEMORIAM: WILLIAM J. STUNTZ 
The editors of the Harvard Law Review respectfully dedicate this 





In October Term 1985, I met two extraordinary men who changed 
my life: Harry Blackmun (for whom I clerked) and Bill Stuntz (who 
was clerking for Justice Powell in the chambers next door).  They were 
connected by the combination of a passion for justice, a profound   
impact on the law, a deep religious faith accompanied (probably not 
coincidentally) by an almost disquieting humility, and a rare gift for 
friendship and celebrating others’ good fortune.  And now yet another 
connection: the Harvard Law Review has given me a chance to cele-
brate each of them.1 
There’s one more tie, hardly surprising in two men so interested in 
American history, statistics, and rules: they were great baseball fans.  
With Bill, it wasn’t just the games: the short walk over to the Univer-
sity of Virginia’s field (where we once saw a triple play and, much to 
Bill’s dismay, always heard the ping of the metal bats) or the long lazy 
drives to Lynchburg for Carolina League matchups (where we marked 
Bill’s birthday with a night in the emergency room after our colleague 
John Harrison was hit by a line drive); it was the conversations.  As 
with criminal procedure and criminal law, Bill had an encyclopedic 
knowledge.  I still remember the afternoon a group of us tried to come 
up with the career home runs leader for each letter of the alphabet.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  ∗  Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law, Stanford Law School. 
  1  See Pamela S. Karlan, A Tribute to Justice Harry A. Blackmun,  108 H ARV.  L.  REV.  13 
(1994); Pamela S. Karlan, In Memoriam: Harry A. Blackmun, 113 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1999).    
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Back then, it was Hank Aaron, Ernie Banks  .  .  .  Carl Yastrzemski, 
Gus Zernial.2  Only Bill knew — indeed, had heard of — Zernial. 
That was a more innocent time, and of course the effervescent 
Banks has been passed by the sullen Barry Bonds.  Several years ago, 
when Bill’s back pain had flared up, I sent him a sympathetic email.  I 
asked whether he remembered Bill James’s power/speed number, 
which is calculated by multiplying a player’s stolen bases by his home 
runs, doubling the product, and dividing it by the sum of stolen bases 
plus home runs.3  The number measures excellence and balance across 
several dimensions.  It’s the generalized formula for things like the 
30/30 club — which sounds more interesting than it is — whose most 
significant repeat players were the Bondses, father and son.  I sug-
gested to Bill that he had to be near the top of the law professor vir-
tue/suffering number. 
Bill replied with his characteristic good humor mixed with an edge: 
“I’m thrilled,” he wrote, “to be mentioned in the vicinity of Barry 
Bonds, though I would have thought the main thing we have in com-
mon is Schedule II controlled substances.”4 
But there are other baseball players with whom Bill had far more 
in common.  At the Festschrift Harvard Law School held for Bill last 
spring, I surveyed the field, dismissing various possibilities — Sandy 
Koufax (strong religious principles but the wrong Testament); Mark 
Teixeira (also a notable Annapolis native, but a Yankee); and Mark 
Belanger (dark, skinny, and lacking discernible musculature, but fam-
ous for being defensive, which Bill never was). 
Perhaps, though, I dismissed Cal Ripken too quickly.  Ripken re-
made what it meant to be a shortstop.  His arm was so strong that he 
could set up deeper in the field, which enabled him to make more 
plays.  But precisely because he played so deep, he made it look easy: 
people sometimes didn’t appreciate Ripken’s fielding because he never 
had to dive to get to the ball.  The same was true of Bill.  He had one 
of the best arms in the legal academy.  Those of us who came to con-
stitutional criminal procedure or the political economy of criminal law 
after Bill may not recognize how much he remade the field, writing 
things that — once he said them — seemed self-evident, but that only 
a man with his gifts could have perceived at first. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  2  See T OTAL BASEBALL  2270 (John Thorn & Pete Palmer eds., 4th ed. 1995) (giving the 
overall career home run leaders); id. at 1404 (giving the statistics for Zernial).  Inspired and too 
often bested in debates with Bill, I bought my own copy. 
  3  See BILL JAMES, THE BILL JAMES BASEBALL ABSTRACT 1987, at 27 (1987).  I inherited 
Justice Blackmun’s copy of James’s Historical Baseball Abstract and later gave a copy of the re-
vised edition to Bill signed by the audience at the Harvard Law School’s celebration of his career.  
See BILL JAMES, THE NEW BILL JAMES HISTORICAL BASEBALL ABSTRACT (2001). 
  4  Email from Bill Stuntz to author (Feb. 15, 2004) (on file with the Harvard Law School  
Library).    
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But ultimately, I arrived at Pee Wee Reese, the great Brooklyn 
shortstop.  Reese’s career has many impressive highlights, but he will 
be remembered — as will Bill — for the grace and human decency 
with which he handled the most vexing issue in our national history, 
the question of race.  Reese was the Dodgers’ captain the year Jackie 
Robinson joined the team.  There was nothing in Reese’s background 
to suggest a passion for equality; he once said that Robinson was the 
first black man with whom he had ever shaken hands.  But when  
Robinson was being heckled by fans in Cincinnati during an early 
road trip, Reese went over to Robinson, engaged him in conversation, 
and put his arm around Robinson’s shoulder in a gesture of support 
that silenced the crowd.  Like Reese, Bill had a gift for friendships 
with people very different from himself along nearly every dimension.  
And his passion for equality and justice shines through his great life’s 
work, the magisterial The Collapse of American Criminal Justice.5 
Bill used a passage from The Merchant of Venice as the epigraph to 
the final chapter of that final work: 
The quality of mercy is not strain’d, 
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven 
Upon the place beneath: It is twice blest; 
It blesseth him that gives and him that takes . . . .6 
Bill always acted as if he were the one who had been blessed.  And 
in many, many ways he was: a devoted and loving family, faith that 
stayed with him through good times and bad, a wonderful career in 
which he transformed a core area of legal doctrine, a legion of admir-
ing students and colleagues, and even a set of World Champion- 
ships — for the Orioles when he was a Baltimore fan and for the Red 
Sox when he moved his loyalties northwards.  But actually, it is we 
who have been blessed to have a colleague and friend like him.  Or as 
Jim Bouton put it: “You see, you spend a good piece of your life grip-
ping a baseball and in the end it turns out that it was the other way 




  5  WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (forthcoming 
2011). 
  6  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act IV, sc. 1, ll. 184–87 (1596). 
  7  JIM BOUTON, BALL FOUR 398 (20th anniversary ed. 1990).    
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Michael J. Klarman
∗ 
Bill Stuntz was, to borrow a baseball analogy, the ultimate five-tool 
law professor: he was an inspiring teacher, a pathbreaking scholar, a 
fabulous colleague, an extraordinary institutional citizen, and an out-
standing person. 
I began my teaching career at the University of Virginia School of 
Law in 1987, one year after Bill Stuntz joined the faculty.  It was one 
of the most fortunate things that ever happened to me, though things 
almost turned out rather differently: Bill nearly got us killed while 
driving to my recruitment dinner in the fall of 1986.  Bill was a terri-
ble driver.  (Operating a motor vehicle is apparently not among the 
five tools required to excel either at baseball or law teaching.)  To 
compound his driving deficiencies, Bill already was exhibiting keen 
nervousness about making tenure, just months into his teaching career.  
This was one of the great jokes among junior faculty at Virginia in the 
late 1980s: if Bill Stuntz was anxious about getting tenure, what did 
that portend for the rest of us mere mortals? 
Both Bill and I taught Criminal Law for the first time in the fall of 
1987.  Literally on a daily basis, we discussed our game plans for class.  
From these conversations, I learned not only a great deal about sub-
stantive criminal law, but also about how to teach.  Bill was a huge 
success in the classroom right from the start.  He was a master of the 
material; he was comfortable at the podium; he was brilliant; he was 
funny; he was appreciative of student comments; and he engaged and 
stretched students’ minds.  Bill was also accessible to students in a 
way I have never seen duplicated by another law professor.  He never 
set office hours, but he was in the office virtually all of the time, and 
he would talk to students whenever they dropped by, and for as long 
as they wanted.  Bill took their ideas seriously, gave them encourage-
ment, and, for many, helped to launch their own academic careers. 
Bill’s scholarship has redefined the fields of Criminal Procedure 
and Criminal Justice.  For the last quarter century, he wrote roughly 
one pioneering article a year — clarifying and transforming our under-
standing of the exclusionary rule, the privilege against self-incrim-
ination, plea bargaining, the uneasy relationship between criminal pro-
cedure and criminal justice, the political economy of the criminal 
justice system, and so much more.  Much of his scholarship applied 
the tools of law and economics — incentive effects, agency costs, bar-
gaining theory, unintended consequences — to a field that rarely had 
been analyzed in such terms.  But what most distinguished Bill’s scho-
larship was its eclecticism: he used the tools of legal doctrine, history, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  ∗  Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.    
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criminology, political science, sociology, and empirical studies to pro-
vide a richly textured analysis of the criminal justice system.  Virtually 
everyone writing in the field today acknowledges — quite happily — 
the intellectual debt they owe to Bill.  His many years of scholarly con-
tributions recently culminated in a soon-to-be published book about 
the history of American criminal procedure and criminal justice, which 
may well be the best book about law I have ever read. 
Moreover, Bill’s scholarship served as an example to his col-
leagues — both at Virginia and at Harvard — of what legal scholar-
ship should be: insightful, creative, rigorous, engaging.  The standard 
of excellence he set in his own work was a model to emulate for an en-
tire generation of junior faculty, who saw their intellectual ambitions 
stretched in ways they could not otherwise have imagined. 
Bill was not only the best colleague I have ever had, he was the 
best colleague I could ever imagine having.  He was curious, knowl-
edgeable, generous with his time, fun to talk to, and the consummate 
team player.  For the first fifteen years of my career, he read virtually 
every word I wrote, and his comments were always invaluable: de-
tailed, incisive, constructive, encouraging.  I would bet that during the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, Bill Stuntz is thanked in the star footnote 
of more than half the law review articles published by Virginia faculty.  
For most of those articles, moreover, Bill requested the manuscript 
from the author, rather than the author soliciting his comments.  He 
was the glue that held Virginia together from 1986 to 2000, and he 
played a similar role at Harvard over the past decade.  If I may be 
forgiven for shifting sports analogies, Bill Stuntz was the Bill Russell 
of legal academia: he helped make all of his teammates the best that 
they could be.  Unlike Russell, however, Stuntz also sought to make 
his “competitors” better.  Virtually every leading criminal procedure 
scholar in the country who is Bill’s age or younger has stories to tell 
about Bill’s extraordinary generosity of spirit: he helped them to im-
prove their scholarship, encouraged their development, and promoted 
their careers. 
Bill was an institutional leader from the get-go.  He was made 
chair of the Virginia appointments committee the year after he earned 
tenure — an extraordinary testament to his colleagues’ faith in his 
good judgment, maturity, and intellectual abilities.  I would bet that in 
the twenty years since then, Bill served on Virginia and Harvard ap-
pointments committees more than half of the time.  Countless col-
leagues — junior and senior — went to him for advice: about their 
scholarship, their teaching, their careers, their lives.  Former Virginia 
dean Bob Scott groomed Bill to be his successor — an appointment 
that would have been greeted with acclamation by the faculty — but 
Bill was not interested.  I have heard a former Harvard dean refer to 
Bill as the most important person on the faculty over the past decade.     
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Last but not least, Bill was an outstanding human being and a 
warm and generous friend.  He was kind, considerate, sincere, de-
pendable, cheerful, and self-deprecating.  (One of the favorite jokes 
about Bill among his friends and colleagues involves recollections of 
the many times that he dropped by their offices; shed pearls of wisdom 
about law, politics, or sports; then apologized profusely for taking up 
so much of their time.)  In twenty-five years, I honestly cannot recall 
Bill ever saying an unkind word about another human being, nor can I 
remember anyone else saying anything unkind about Bill. 
Yet, I think the most important lesson I learned from Bill Stuntz 
(leaving aside the many lessons about baseball that he thought he 
taught me) is that people who do not see eye to eye politically can still 
respect, admire, and cherish one another.  In our increasingly polarized 
culture, people of all political stripes are too quick to vilify those with 
whom they disagree.  Yet it was impossible for anyone to dislike Bill 
simply because of political disagreements.  Nobody who knew him 
could ever question his integrity, his good will, his compassion for the 
least advantaged in our society.  Through his example, he taught that 
political disagreements often are about means rather than ends, and 
that one should try to understand and empathize with those with 
whom one disagrees, rather than to demonize them.  I cannot count 
the number of people I have told about this important lesson and from 
whom I learned it. 
Bill’s legacy will live on for decades in the hearts and minds of 
thousands of students and scores of colleagues.  I believe that he was 





Nobel Prize–winning physicist Steven Weinberg once said, “The ef-
fort to understand the universe is one of the very few things that lifts 
human life a little above the level of farce, and gives it some of the 
grace of tragedy.”1 
No one made more or better efforts to understand the universe of 
criminal law and criminal justice than did Professor William Stuntz; in 
so doing, he lifted the sights of readers while challenging us to see bet-
ter and do better. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  ∗  Dean and Jeremiah Smith, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law School. 
  1  STEVEN WEINBERG, THE FIRST THREE MINUTES 155 (1993).    
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There are two elements of Bill’s personality that warrant mention, 
right from the start: first was his uncanny modesty, admirable any-
where, but simply a rarity in the law school world.  The second was 
his irrepressible honesty.  I loved seeing the two traits together.  Hence, 
on his webpage that listed his areas for supervising student work and 
responding to press queries, he wrote, simply, “All aspects of criminal 
justice system.”2 
In friends, collaborators, and colleagues, Bill brought together 
prosecutor types and public defender types; Southerners and Nor-
therners; bloggers and joggers; Red Sox fans and everyone else. 
Bill lifted up crucial issues and approaches throughout his distin-
guished career.  It is not enough, he taught us, to suggest that Ameri-
can criminal justice punishes too severely.  Yes, dysfunctional politics 
and personal and systemic biases in prosecution and incarceration 
produce a criminal justice system that disproportionately affects blacks 
and Hispanics.  But those explanations do not account for the wild 
swings from the lenient to the excessively punitive in criminal sanc-
tions.  Nor do those factors sufficiently address the underprotection of 
blacks and Hispanics through criminal law. 
Bill’s work emphasizes that the pathologies of the system stem not 
merely from the abuse of minorities by electoral majorities, but also 
from the more pernicious and subtle incentives affecting the interac-
tions of prosecutors, legislators, and judges.  In his words, 
As criminal law expands, both lawmaking and adjudication pass into the 
hands of police and prosecutors; law enforcers, not the law, determine who 
goes to prison and for how long.  The end point of this progression is 
clear: criminal codes that cover everything and decide nothing, that serve 
only to delegate power to district attorneys’ offices and police depart-
ments.  .  .  .  In a criminal justice system that incarcerates two million 
people, criminal law is becoming a sideshow.  It seems like, and is, an un-
healthy state of affairs.3 
Bill’s reminder to us, always, is to address the political economy of 
criminal justice; he also brought to all of his work his personal wisdom 
about emotion and mercy.  I want to suggest one more theme that 
permeates the work of Bill Stuntz, and that is the theme of grace. 
I don’t mean grace as the brand name of Caribbean cuisine, as es-
tablished in 1922,4 nor a song on the fourth album of the Britpop band 
Supergrass.5  Closer to what I mean is the dictionary’s reference to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  2  William J. Stuntz, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/ 
index.html?id=95 (last visited May 5, 2011). 
  3  William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 509 
(2001). 
  4  GRACE, http://www.gracefoods.com/ (last visited May 5, 2011). 
  5  SUPERGRASS, Grace, on LIFE ON OTHER PLANETS (Parlophone Records 2002).    
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grace: “propriety, seemliness, comeliness.”6  For example, “performed 
the necessary task without fanfare and with a quiet grace.”7  Even bet-
ter the notion of a disposition to kindness and compassion, as in: “the 
victor’s grace in treating the vanquished.”8 
Christian theologian Frederick Buechner said, 
The grace of God means something like: Here is your life.  You might 
never have been, but you are because the party wouldn’t have been com-
plete without you.  Here is the world.  Beautiful and terrible things will 
happen.  Don’t be afraid.  I am with you.  Nothing can ever separate us.  
It’s for you I created the universe.  I love you.   
    There’s only one catch.  Like any other gift, the gift of grace can be 
yours only if you’ll reach out and take it.   
    Maybe being able to reach out and take it is a gift too.9 
Bill Stuntz, in his blogging and in his unassuming and brutally 
honest confrontation with what life handed him, gave us a glimpse of 
grace, arising somewhere between blessing and tragedy. 
Mindful of and humbled by luck and fate, honest about what’s 
hard and scary,10 Bill’s gifts as a teacher, mentor, and colleague were 
rivaled only by his devotion as husband, father, and friend.  The Har-
vard Law School and the community of scholars — as well as the 
community connected by Bill’s writings — are better, wiser, kinder be-
cause of Bill Stuntz.  And to Bill, I leave the last word, for he so well 
described our need for humility and also our need for judgment and 
work to repair what we find around us: “We understand that the 
world is not what it should be, and that our own capacities to under-




  6  See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 984 (1986). 
  7  Id. 
  8  Id. 
  9  FREDERICK BUECHNER, WISHFUL THINKING: A THEOLOGICAL ABC 34 (1973). 
  10  See  William Stuntz,  More Cancer,  LESS  THAN  THE  LEAST  (Apr.  3, 2008, 1:09 PM), 
www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/dskeel/archives/2008/04/more_cancerstuntz.html. 
  11  Timothy Dalrymple, You Will Call, I Will Answer: An Interview with William Stuntz, 
PATHEOS (Feb. 2, 2010), http://www.patheos.com/Resources/Additional-Resources/You-Will-Call-
I-Will-Answer.html?& showAll=1#.    
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Daniel C. Richman
∗ 
Bill made a lot of errors in his articles.  I know that, because he 
told me so, often in graphic detail, sometimes years after writing them; 
sometimes days.1  As anyone familiar with Bill or his work knows, this 
sort of harsh self-criticism bespeaks not any laxity or insouciance on 
Bill’s part, or even a false modesty, but rather an intense commitment 
to intellectual rigor, and (even more astounding for a legal academic) 
actually “getting it right.”2  The charity that pervaded Bill’s comments 
about the efforts of others — a generosity for which I will always be in 
Bill’s debt — was sorely absent when Bill turned to his own work.  
There was a scary glee in his voice as Bill spoke of what he’d be writ-
ing for the celebration of his work that he grudgingly allowed to occur 
last year.  Its title and theme, he announced, would be “Here are some 
of the things I got wrong.”  Suffice it to say that those of us at the cel-
ebration were utterly unpersuaded by Bill’s effort to undermine the 
significance and resilience of his towering contributions to our field. 
One would think that intellectual rigor and personal humility,3 
however useful for deconstructing synthetic edifices, would hamper 
Bill’s pursuit of the most ambitious scholarly agenda imaginable in his 
chosen field: trying to understand the interaction of criminal procedure 
rights with police policies, showing the destructive relationship be-
tween substantive criminal legislation and ostensible criminal proce-
dure protections, and piecing together the story of how American crim-
inal justice became so punitive.  Any effort to tell these sweeping 
stories would seem to demand a self-confidence and disregard for 
nuance totally at odds with Bill’s personality.  At the heart of Bill’s 
contributions, however, lies a creativity that embraces the rejoinders it 
provokes, and has produced lasting intellectual frameworks that can 
only be strengthened and refined by the criticism they welcome. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  ∗  Paul J. Kellner Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. 
  1  This must mean that everything wrong in the pieces I’ve written with him is Bill’s fault.  
See  Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political 
Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2005); Daniel C. Richman, Kate 
Stith & William J. Stuntz, Defining Federal Crimes (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
Harvard Law School Library) (a draft that keeps changing as the federal courts make up new un-
common law). 
  2  “Getting it right,” for those unfamiliar with the term, entails a rough correspondence be-
tween one’s theoretical (and, one hopes, counterintuitive) analytical frameworks and external   
realities. 
  3  See William J. Stuntz, Christian Legal Theory, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1744 (2003) (book 
review) (“Imagine how differently most law review articles would read if their authors admitted 
the possibility that they might be mistaken.”); cf. Letter from Oliver Cromwell to the General As-
sembly of the Kirk of Scotland (Aug. 3, 1650), in 2 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF OLIVER 
CROMWELL 302, 303 (Wilbur Cortez Abbott ed., 1939) (“I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, 
think it possible you may be mistaken.”).     
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Just as I can only dimly grasp the deep connection between Bill’s 
faith and the stoicism with which he long bore pain and debilitating 
illness, so am I hard pressed to articulate the connection, if any, be-
tween Bill’s medical travails and the powerful image of “pathology” 
that does wonderful normative work in his probing analyses of crimi-
nal justice in the United States.  I can, however, appreciate the mag-
nificent fact that Bill committed himself to articulating how the health 
of our criminal justice system can be improved even as he accepted the 
unlikelihood of improvement in his own. 
Bill’s diagnosis of this penal pathology is couched in terms of insti-
tutional design and power allocation.  “The justice system stopped 
working,” his forthcoming book explains (in characteristically forth-
right language), “when a particular kind of local democracy — the 
kind in which residents of high-crime neighborhoods shape the law en-
forcement that operates on their streets — ceased to govern the ways 
police officers, prosecutors, and trial judges do their jobs.”4  At the 
heart of the treatment Bill proposed, however, is an extraordinary, in-
deed inspiring, faith in humanity.  Even as he recognized the intoler-
ance, corruption, and stupidity that have played all too large a part in 
our criminal justice history, he believed in the potential of most Ameri-
cans, when confronted with their fellows up close, to know and do jus-
tice, even when given the discretion to do otherwise.  It’s not only this 
faith, however, but a deep engagement with reality that led Bill to for-
go the flight from politics that so many others in the field would make.  
Rather than call for insulated commissions or new judicially protected 
rights, Bill would have us return to the fray.  While “the right kind of 
constitutional restrictions would make for a better and fairer justice 
system,” he wrote, “the more urgent need is for a better brand of poli-
tics: one that takes full account of the different harms crime and   
punishment do to those who suffer them — and one that gives those 
sufferers the power to render their neighborhoods more peaceful, and 
more just.”5  Bill made no claim that doing the right thing is easy.  Just 
necessary.  And that’s the way he lived his life. 
Let me end, as I began, on a note of failure.  In his preferences — 
baseball, cheap beer, and in general what Pam Karlan has properly 
called Bill’s “goyish” tastes — in his perpetual chip on his shoulder 
about the loss of the Colts to the Jets in 1969, and his refusal to take 
on the airs of the academic elite, Bill strove his entire adult life to be 
an ordinary person.  In this, he had a marked lack of success.  Ever 
since I met Bill in 1985 — when I drafted dissents for Justice Marshall 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  4  WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (forthcoming 2011) (Jan. 
2011 manuscript at 269). 
  5  Id. (Jan. 2011 manuscript at 9–10).    
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to the criminal majorities Bill drafted for Justice Powell — Bill was a 
towering intellectual presence, an academic colleague without peer, 
and a friend whose dry wit, sense of humor, and scorn at façades and 
pretense made my life (and I’ll bet the lives of so many others) more 





My relationship with Bill Stuntz began in 1981 when he was as-
signed as a first-year student to my course in Contracts.  This was a 
large class — close to 150 students as I recall.  And, in a quirk of the 
random selection mechanism, the class contained a majority of the 
students who would later comprise the managing board of the Virginia 
Law Review.  As a group, they made that class one of the best teaching 
experiences of my life in Contracts. 
To be sure, Bill was an anonymous member of this extraordinary 
group for a month or two, but after a while, having called on him sev-
eral times, I knew that this one was a gem: like many others in the 
class he was smart and very well prepared, but what distinguished Bill 
was his remarkable skill at making good legal arguments.  He had a 
rare gift — an intuitive ability to distinguish good arguments from sil-
ly ones.  All this is true, but it is only the preface for the story I am 
about to tell. 
By the second semester, we reached the point where it was time to 
think about relational contracting in fairly rigorous terms.  The ma-
terial was hard for many students as it involved a good bit of econom-
ic analysis, but I had confidence that, with the assistance of Stuntz and 
his cohort, difficult concepts would be clarified quickly.  By now, Bill’s 
hand was often in the air and, almost invariably, he made really smart 
points — but not always.  One day, I was teaching how parties to rela-
tional contracts can agree on the optimal quantity of goods to produce 
and sell.  I used a simple graphic of a marginal cost curve sloping up-
ward and a marginal revenue curve intersecting it sloping down. 
Then I posed a softball question to the class: Assume the parties 
consist of a principal as the producer of a good and an agent as the 
good’s distributor, and assume that they know these curves.  I then 
asked, “at what point would they ideally want the agent to stop sell-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  ∗  Alfred McCormack Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.    
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ing?”  All will recall from their Introductory Economics course in col-
lege that the stopping point is at the point of maximum joint profit-
ability where the curves intersect.  I looked out in the class and to my 
relief spotted Bill with his hand in the air: “Yes, Mr. Stuntz.”  “When 
the lines are the farthest apart,” he said proudly.  I was completely 
nonplused.  All I could do (as he would later remind me for years to 
come) was to say, five times over, NO! NO! NO! NO! NO! 
Notwithstanding this one embarrassment, Bill excelled in Con-
tracts, earning the highest grade in the class in both semesters.  We 
kept in contact as he progressed through law school and so I was de-
lighted when my colleagues and I could welcome him back to Virginia 
as a colleague several years later.  I confess that I was disappointed 
when Bill — against my best advice — chose criminal procedure   
rather than contracts and commercial law as his scholarly concentra-
tion, but after several years we agreed to co-teach a seminar on Plea 
Bargaining, and out of the seminar came a law review article: Plea 
Bargaining as Contract.1  In the middle of the editing process for the 
article, I was named dean of the Law School and Bill with customary 
grace assumed one hundred percent of the responsibility for preparing 
the piece and a subsequent reply for publication.  When the editors re-
quested citations, I told Bill to deal with it.  Only later did I discover 
that this required endless hours of negotiations with the Yale Law 
Journal over my practice of reusing old footnotes that I had first trot-
ted out in earlier articles. 
For the next ten years our relationship took on a somewhat differ-
ent cast.  Bill became a most valued informal advisor and confidant.  I 
used to walk the halls, especially in the late afternoon.  Sooner or later, 
I would end up at Bill’s office.  The door was open, his feet were on 
the desk, surrounded by piles of books, hundreds of empty Coke cans, 
and other detritus.  Not once did he indicate that his time could be 
better spent on his own projects, and I would usually unburden myself 
about matters far removed from his own sphere of interests.  Often our 
conversations would turn to baseball.  I hope I am not disclosing a 
closely guarded secret when I reveal to his Cambridge friends that Bill 
was then a life-long devoted fan of the Baltimore Orioles.  As for me, 
forty years of loyally rooting for the Cleveland Indians had brought 
nothing but grief.  But 1995 was a new dawn for the Indians: they 
streaked to the top and won the American League Pennant, led by an 
exciting lineup that included a young slugger named Manny Ramirez.  
Bill was skeptical of their ultimate success, however, given Ramirez’s 
unfortunate tendency to sleepwalk through all aspects of the game 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  1  Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz,  Plea Bargaining as Contract,  101 Y ALE  L.J.  1909 
(1992).    
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other than hitting.  “Nobody is ever going to win the World Series with 
that guy in left field,” he prophesied.  This was quite false as it turned 
out to his great delight when his adopted Red Sox won the World Se-
ries in 2004 and 2007, led both times by Manny Ramirez. 
More often, Bill’s advice and counsel was prescient.  Early in my 
deanship I made a rookie mistake.  In the 1940s the local bar associa-
tion had donated a wall plaque to the Law School and it had hung ev-
er since in the central hallway of the School.  The plaque was a quote 
from Samuel Johnson entitled “A prayer before the study of the law.”  
A Jewish student had objected to the plaque and its explicitly Chris-
tian message and, after consulting with my constitutional lawyers on 
the faculty (and armed with a vision of Thomas Jefferson’s legacy as 
the author of the Virginia Declaration on Religious Freedom), I had 
the plaque taken down in obedience to the First Amendment.  All hell 
broke loose.  The evangelical Christian community at the Law School 
was outraged, the issue was taken to the Rutherford Institute (and to 
Rush Limbaugh), and soon we were being sued for violating the stu-
dents’ exercise of religious expression in a public forum.  University 
trustees and important donors weighed in against this arrogant exer-
cise of political correctness.  The university administration was content 
for me to hang there, in the words of John Ehrlichman, twisting slowly 
in the wind.  So, I turned to Bill.  And with the help of a mutual 
friend, Richard Dean, they were able to reach out to the students and 
persuade them that Scott might be stupid but he had a good heart.  
We finally reached a compromise: to place the plaque in the display 
case of the rare book room, where it remains to this day.  Bill’s role in 
this episode was typical of his character: quiet and modest, and behind 
the scenes he persuaded the students to drop the litigation and I   
survived. 
My memories inevitably race forward to the summer of 1999 and 
Bill’s decision whether to leave Virginia for Harvard.  I am embar-
rassed to say that I pulled every trick fair and foul to try to get him to 
stay.  When he told me he was leaving I was, quite frankly, devastated.  
From then on our time together was more limited and much of the 
time we communicated by phone or in the long and incredibly helpful 
memos Bill would faithfully write as I continued to send him drafts of 
my articles for comment.  The comments are so evocative of Bill, that 
I must share a few of the opening lines. 
From February 1, 2002: “Bob: I’ve now read the default rules pa-
per.  I doubt I have any useful comments.  I have only two points, 
both probably wrong.”  This statement was followed by two pages of 
insightful comments. 
From January 31, 2003: “Bob: I’m sorry for taking so long to get 
back to you.  Following are some brief comments on A Theory of Self-
Enforcing Agreements.  Actually, as you’ll see, I only have one com-   
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ment and it’s not much of one.”  This “single” comment extended for 
three single-spaced pages and made its way practically verbatim into 
the final version of the article.2 
Finally, June 2003: “Bob, I liked the Contract Theory paper a lot, 
but I have little to say: you guys are four steps ahead of me.”  This was 
followed by two more pages of the best critique I received on that pa-
per, concluding with the following: “What about contracting for proce-
dure rather than substance.  It seems to me your argument logically 
implies that the parties ought to be able to alter the evidence rules that 
would govern in a court proceeding or alter the burden of persuasion 
and the like.”  That single comment was the foundation for a paper on 
Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design that George Triantis and I 
published two years later.3  So, Bill might not have known anything 
about contract theory but he sure made important contributions to the 
field. 
But, as the years went by, most of all I looked forward to the tele-
phone calls.  They always came with the familiar greeting that all of 
Bill’s friends recognized as his peculiar form of self-deprecation: “Bob?  
This is Bill . . . .  I hope I’m not bothering you . . . .”  My answer was 
always the same.  “No Bill, not at all . . . but how about those Yan-
kees!”  Invariably, I was repaid by a joyful guffaw followed by what I 
had been hoping for all along — a hoot of derision.  And then we were 





The first rumor we students heard when Bill Stuntz returned to the 
University of Virginia to teach after his Supreme Court clerkship was 
that he hadn’t gotten into Virginia the first time he applied.  He’d 
been turned down, the story went, spent a year working as a clerk at a 
local hotel called the Boar’s Head Inn, got in on his second try, then 
went on to graduate first in his class.  It was fitting that even the ru-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  2  For an illustration of “pure” Stuntz, see Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agree-
ments, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1674–75 (2003). 
  3  Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE 
L.J. 814 (2006). 
  ∗  S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.    
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mor Bill spawned was encouraging to the rest of us (we too might start 
humbly yet achieve great success).1   
I sometimes wonder if that year as a hotel clerk was one of the se-
cret ingredients of Bill’s humility.  At a presentation by a scholar in 
family law or bankruptcy, Bill would preface his question by saying 
that he didn’t know anything about the subject and seem to mean it.  
After giving an hour of his time to work through an idea or a paper or 
a problem that someone was struggling with, he would apologize to 
them for “taking up so much of [their] afternoon.”  This might be easy 
for someone who really doesn’t know a great deal or really is presum-
ing on the student’s or friend’s or colleague’s time.  It was almost un-
fathomable in a scholar who transformed an important area of legal 
scholarship — criminal law and criminal procedure — and pioneered 
another — contemporary Christianity and law. 
One of Bill’s colleagues once told me that Bill was the “dumbest 
smart person she’d ever met.”  This wasn’t intended as an insult 
(though I suspect she may also have had Bill’s penchant for putting 
ketchup on steaks or his susceptibility to practical jokes in mind).   
What she meant was that Bill’s intuitions — the ideas he thought were 
self-evident — were often anything but self-evident to everyone else.  
In one of his most famous articles, Bill showed that the new constitu-
tional protections the Supreme Court had put in place for criminal de-
fendants (such as the Miranda rule and an expanded exclusionary rule) 
may actually have had a perverse effect on criminal justice.2  In 
another article, Bill identified and solved a paradox with the crimi-
nalization of gambling and the social battles over abortion and gay 
rights: the odd tendency of these laws to undermine the very norms 
they are designed to promote.3 
Bill’s commentary in popular magazines was as stunningly coun-
terintuitive as his legal scholarship, and I believe his meditations on 
his cancer will have as powerful an impact in their way as his seminal 
criminal procedure articles.4  Indeed, they already have.  Each time 
Bill emailed me a post for the blog we co-authored (always telling me 
not to use it unless I thought it was “okay”), I would brace for the 
emails I would receive as soon as it went up.  Many confided, to   
paraphrase only slightly, that my “posts weren’t so bad, but Bill’s — 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  1  Much later I learned, much to my surprise, that even the first part of the rumor was true.  I 
suspect that UVA’s admissions standards, or perhaps the admissions officer, were soon changed. 
  2  William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Jus-
tice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997) (arguing that, because their fees are capped, defense attorneys may 
focus on the new procedural objections and forgo the careful investigation that would be neces-
sary to determine whether the defendant may be innocent). 
  3  William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871 (2000). 
  4  For Bill’s meditations on cancer, see LESS THAN THE LEAST, http://www.law.upenn.edu/ 
blogs/dskeel/archives/health_and_daily_life/ (last visited May 5, 2011).    
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well, they were simply unforgettable.”  As my wife once put it: “Every-
thing Bill writes is interesting.” 
The irony of having such an original mind is that one’s insights 
may become the conventional wisdom.  Novel at the beginning, ob-
vious when everyone else catches up.   
Bill would never have begrudged this.  This wasn’t because he 
lacked ambition or didn’t value it,5 but because he believed that our 
enterprise as legal scholars of trying to better understand and perhaps 
improve the world is a collective one.  This commitment to our com-
mon mission was perhaps most evident in something Bill, unlike most 
scholars of his stature, didn’t have: disciples.  The work of some   
scholars — such as Daniel Richman of Columbia, my colleague Ste-
phanos Bibas, or Barbara Armacost of the University of Virginia — 
would be hard to imagine without Bill’s inspiration.  And countless 
scholars have borrowed from Stuntz — “stealing” his insights, as Da-
vid Sklansky has written.6  But Bill encouraged new thinking, not de-
votion to his own ideas. 
Two attributes of Bill’s insights will nevertheless keep them from 
dissolving into the conventional wisdom.  The first is simply that his 
best known ideas were so radically new when he developed them.  No 
one can talk about the unintended consequences of the Supreme 
Court’s constitutional criminal procedure cases or the political pres-
sures to steadily expand federal criminal law without a nod to Bill’s 
work. 
The other is more aesthetic: the arresting images that capture the 
ideas.  Bill famously described the constant pressure to criminalize 
publicly salient misbehavior as a “one-way ratchet.”7  And he spoke of 
law’s “double game” — the need to police sinfulness without giving 
lawmakers so much discretion that they will enforce a law in discrimi-
natory fashion, an objective he later called the “modest rule of law.”8 
During my final year of law school — and Bill’s first of teaching — 
I did a small amount of research for him.  Bill didn’t just give me a 
research assignment; he asked me to critique his draft, and treated my 
ill-informed comments as if they might teach him something.  I wasn’t 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  5  A small example: several months before a major conference at Harvard Law School honor-
ing Bill’s work last spring, I told him I was struggling to suppress my impulse to treat the con-
ference as an opportunity to enhance my own professional status.  Bill surprised me by saying: “I 
think you’re wrestling too much.  There isn’t anything wrong with seeking some professional gain 
for yourself in this or any conference — that’s the chief reason to have conferences.” 
  6  David Sklansky, Stealing Bill Stuntz,  in T HE  POLITICAL  HEART  OF  CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON THEMES OF WILLIAM STUNTZ (forthcoming 2012). 
  7  William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 509 
(2001).   
  8  David A. Skeel, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Christianity and the (Modest) Rule of Law, 8 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 809 (2006).    
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used to having professors who didn’t assume they already knew most 
of what there was to know.  Many years later, an evening janitor got 
the same treatment when Bill and I encountered him as we walked 
through the tunnels of Harvard Law School on our way to a meeting 
with the law school’s Christian Legal Society students: Bill greeted the 
janitor by name, asked about his family, and stopped to talk. 
Even in his final weeks, Bill loved to laugh.  The last time I saw 
him, he joked, almost as soon as I’d walked in the door, that he had 
“already lived past [his] expiration date.” 
In an essay about heaven, C.S. Lewis wrote:  
It may be possible for each to think too much of his own potential glory 
hereafter; it is hardly possible for him to think too often or too deeply 
about that of his neighbour.  The load, or weight, or burden of my neigh-
bour’s glory should be laid on my back, a load so heavy that only humility 
can carry it . . . .9   
The essay, which Bill once called his favorite Lewis writing, extols 
those who recognize both that “[t]here are no ordinary people,”10 and 
that even “the dullest and most uninteresting person you can talk to 
may one day be a creature which, if you saw it now, you would be 
strongly tempted to worship.”11 
Anyone who knew Bill can guess, although Bill probably could not, 





“Niiice,” he would say.  “Nice.”  He’d be nodding, eyes lit up, and 
speaking with the kind of appreciative tone someone else might use to 
describe a sports car or a vintage wine.  This was Bill’s reaction to an 
interesting point made by a colleague or a student, in conversation or 
in class.  Never much into sports cars or wine himself, Bill really en-
joyed and appreciated discussions about ideas — his, yours, it didn’t 
really matter.  He was as likely to give you a “nice” for a point dis-
agreeing with something he’d just said or written as for agreeing with 
or flattering him.  “That’s very sweet of you,” he’d say, dubiously, if 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  9  C.S. LEWIS, The Weight of Glory, in THE WEIGHT OF GLORY AND OTHER ADDRESSES 
3, 18 (Walter Hooper ed., 1980). 
  10  Id. at 19. 
  11  Id. at 18. 
  ∗  Howard J. and Katherine W. Aibel Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.    
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someone complimented his own work.  “But I’m not sure I’ve got it 
right.”  I loved eliciting a “nice” from Bill, but it was absolutely magic 
when he shined the beam of his appreciation on a student in the class-
room.  Bill and I taught together on more than one occasion, and I saw 
how his confidence and delight in the capacity of students to engage 
with him on his level energized and excited a class. 
Bill’s faith in the capacities of others was part of his larger kind-
ness and decency.  Bill was, in fact, one of the kindest and most decent 
people I have ever met, while also being extraordinarily talented and 
ambitious.  It’s clear, however, that he put kindness and decency first, 
way ahead of the nurturance of his own talents and ambitions.  He 
was never too busy to talk to a colleague or student, and that openness 
led to heavy demands on his time.  The number of students and junior 
colleagues who have relied on his interest and support over the years is 
too large to calculate.  I count myself as one of Bill’s mentees, as he of-
fered advice and intellectual engagement over the course of my own 
career — from the publication of my first article, which he commented 
on substantively the very first time I met him, to career advice he of-
fered as recently as two weeks before his death. 
Bill took his obligations to institutions as seriously as he took his 
obligations to individuals.  He believed deeply in serving the law 
school and rarely if ever said no when asked to take on responsibilities, 
even time-consuming and contentious ones.  In the last months of his 
illness, he often asked if I thought it would be OK for him to miss a 
particular faculty workshop or meeting.  The first few times, I just 
said, “Of course, Bill.”  But when he persisted, I started rolling my 
eyes and saying, “You’ve got to be kidding!”  But he wasn’t kidding.  
“Doing the right thing” and “being a good person” — these weren’t 
platitudes to Bill; they lay at the very heart of who he was.  If Bill 
were a building, these commitments would be the cornerstones, and all 
of his many talents and achievements only the ornamental trim. 
Being kind and decent, however, didn’t make Bill a pushover.  He 
was extraordinarily demanding of himself and others intellectually.   
During the last year of his life, Bill pushed himself through growing 
fatigue and pain to finish his book on The Collapse of American Crim-
inal Justice — a sprawling opus that represents the culmination and 
synthesis of much of his recent work and thought.  The steely determi-
nation that drove Bill to finish his book also drove his commitment to 
“get it right.”  When he sent me the manuscript, it was clear that he 
wanted to know what needed to be added, expanded, changed, or 
tweaked.  Even as he edited, Bill was never satisfied, always sure that 
“getting it right” would demand more thought, more time, more wres-
tling.  Although Bill was kinder to the work of others than to his own, 
it wasn’t because he didn’t see the flaws; rather, he simply expressed 
himself differently in outward-directed critique.  Those who knew Bill    
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well knew to start taking notes when he’d begin, “I could be wrong 
about this, but . . . .”  Unfortunately, he wasn’t often wrong. 
Bill’s own work, flawed though he was convinced it was, has ex-
cited and transformed the legal academy in our shared field of crimi-
nal justice.  Bill sought to break down the artificial divide that had 
long separated the study of substantive criminal law and criminal pro-
cedure, and he tried to understand and map out the subtle interactions 
among the different components of the criminal justice system.  Tena-
ciously productive, even in pain and illness, Bill produced work that 
often defied easy categorization.  Not only did it evade the sub-
stance/procedure divide, it also eluded the right/left political divide 
that is so apparent in most work on criminal justice.  On the one hand, 
Bill was cheered by the traditional “right” for his critique of the War-
ren Court’s criminal procedure revolution and its (in)famous embrace 
of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule and the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Miranda warnings.  On the other hand, Bill’s critique of the 
Warren Court was based not on concern about insufficient “law and 
order,” but rather on traditionally “left-wing” concerns about the dis-
tributive effects of the criminal procedure revolution.  The enormous 
increase in the American incarceration rate since the 1970s and its 
marked racially disparate impact lay at the heart of what Bill believed 
was wrong with the American criminal justice system. 
One of the more recent conversations I had with Bill was about a 
play I’d seen and liked, called Take Me Out, a Tony-award winning 
play about the public coming out of a gay Major League baseball 
player.1  I thought Bill, an avid baseball fan, would be amused by the 
soliloquy at the end of Act One, comparing baseball to democracy: 
“[B]aseball is a perfect metaphor for hope in a democratic society. . . . 
Everyone is given exactly the same chance.  And the opportunity to 
exercise that chance at his own pace. . . . What I mean is, in baseball 
there’s no clock.  What could be more generous than to give everyone 
all these opportunities and the time to seize them in as well? . . .  And 
baseball is better than democracy  . . . because,  unlike  democracy, 
baseball acknowledges loss.  While conservatives tell you, ‘Leave 
things alone and no one will lose,’ and liberals tell you, ‘Interfere a lot 
and no one will lose,’ baseball says, ‘Someone will lose.’  Not only says 
it — insists upon it!  So that baseball achieves the tragic vision democ-
racy evades.  Evades and embodies.”2  Bill smiled in recognition when 
I quoted this soliloquy, because he had turned his own work toward 
that “tragic vision,” focusing his attention on the losers in our democ-
racy.  He called the politics of American criminal justice “pathological” 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  1  RICHARD GREENBERG, TAKE ME OUT (2003). 
  2  Id. at 35–37.    
1860  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 124:1841 
in their relentless turn toward harshness, especially for poor and mi-
nority defendants.3 
In many ways, Bill was a bundle of contradictions.  He was both 
more conservative politically than most law professors and at the same 
time more radical.  He was extraordinarily successful and intellectually 
ambitious, but at the same time deeply humble.  He was a devout and 
committed Christian, yet very much a questioner of everything, includ-
ing issues of religious doctrine and faith.  He lived a fairly convention-
al life, yet he enjoyed and admired people who broke conventions and 
took chances.  These contradictions didn’t cancel each other out;   
rather, they somehow added up to something bigger — the very defini-
tion of what people mean when they call someone a “true original.” 
Cancer is a cruel disease in its usually long, painful, and debilitat-
ing denouement.  But it also gives the gift of time — time for families 
and friends to say and do all the things that need saying and doing at 
the end of a life.  In his last weeks, I was able to sit with Bill and to 
find the words to tell him what he meant to me as a colleague and 
friend.  I told him no more than the truth — that his distinctive voice 
will always be in my head, gently critiquing me (“I could be wrong 
about this, but . . . .”) and offering me, I hope and energetically aspire 






  3  William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law,  100 M ICH.  L.  REV.  505 
(2001). 